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ABSTRACT
“Climate anarchy” describes the divergence of climate politics from established mechanisms of global governance, and an emergent political order.  This new (dis)order represents alternative governances and politics, and a challenge to national governmental perspectives on world politics.  When maturing inter-state policy-making such as that on climate change falters at the point of agreement – as it has from Copenhagen in 2009, to Rio+20, and on to Warsaw in 2013 – this engenders different global relationships as the narrowly defined anarchy of national jurisdictions is superseded by a wider anarchic diversity in political practices.  If states must respond to climate change, they are not leading climate policy effectively, and state-centric perspectives cannot account for such political disorder.  The ensuing discomfort about fragmentation of climate governance should be embraced as an opportunity for political innovation, and the diverse responses to climate change viewed as an emerging paradigmatic shift in world politics.  The argument thus informs broader debates on policy and governance, as well as conceptual and disciplinary developments, by testing the construction, governance, and anarchy of climate issues. 
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States are failing to grapple effectively with climate issues, allowing a new form of political anarchy to emerge.  This “climate anarchy” indicates a divergence from established mechanisms of global governance, and the construction of societies and polities employing alternative modes of governance practice.  This is a challenge to conventional constructivist and institutionalist perspectives on inter-state policy-making, but a challenge which should be welcomed.  When global climate change policy falters at the point of agreement – as it did in failing to agree terms at Copenhagen in 2009, with little progress at Durban in 2011, or Rio+20 and Doha in 2012, or Warsaw in 2013 – such a lapse in effective global governance creates the conditions for diverse regional and local practices: ironically, at Warsaw’s UNFCCC COP19 the first ‘Dialogue of the Cities Day’, organized by the International Council for Environmental initiatives (ICLEI) and the Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) and EUROCITIES, provided the opportunity for one environmental minister to say that ‘the only people with the power to change anything are the local elected officials’ (Jervey 2013).  This may be viewed as a novel blend of multi-level public and private domains of agency, involving a wide range of initiatives including ‘climate clubs’ (Widerberg and Stenson 2013) which may not always be oriented to global governance.  In turn this creates rather different global relationships in both form and content, as the familiar anarchic element of world politics in national jurisdictional terms is tested by the anarchic diversity of practices in social terms.  The implications of such a shift range far beyond climate issues because of the direct connection to economic practices, which has of course hampered agreement and complicated political relations.  The relationships are further complicated by the long term intergenerational implications of climate change which existing institutional practice is not well-placed to deal with (Gardiner 2011).  This all suggests renewed prospects for bottom-up change as local social practices inform global political ones, perhaps through “social power” (van Ham 2010), given the “scalar politics” (MacKinnon 2011)  and challenging issues of justice and equity in climate governance (Vanderheiden 2008).  Such developments may be viewed as political opportunities, understood in the context of a new political structure of “climate anarchy” which better captures the emerging political diversity and fluidity, though it does not offer the comfort of a settled political arena.  This is a discomfort to be embraced, since anarchy is not chaos; the challenge is to appreciate the manner in which such “anarchy” avoids established hierarchies of rule without necessitating disorder, or the absence of politics.  Climate anarchy simply describes a different kind of order.
The argument for a climate anarchy perspective is presented first in terms of the problem of political coherence and an emergent novel form of anarchy, and then pursued in terms of a possible political order emerging from the construction, governance, and constructive anarchy of climate politics.

Fragmentation and Coherence
A concern with fragmentation of global environmental governance sets the global perspective of international organizations against the local perspective of sub-state and non-state actors.  In fact any such fragmentation represents an opportunity for policy-makers to capitalize on smaller scale initiatives and enhanced incentives for behavioural change.  Ultimately, such initiatives and incentives will have a greater collective impact than statements of principle made in the intergovernmental context, as is recognised in calls for non-state action on climate even from within that context. Though any such “high-level” statements remain necessary as expressions of political commitment, they are largely disconnected from political action.  Similarly, while international agreements are necessarily implemented by national governments in terms of formal authority, the key actors are smaller groups and individuals.  If governmental structure remains, it is form without content, and climate agency is moving elsewhere. National governments, sub-state governments in federal systems, and integrated inter-governmental actors such as the EU are clearly a locus of formal policy-making, but contributions to policy-formation and implementation of policy involve a much wider range of actors who are now driving climate policy.  Indeed, those concerned with governance call for “stronger consultative rights for civil society representatives in intergovernmental institutions” (Biermann et al 2012: 1307).  Thus what may appear to be a problematic fragmentation of governance, from a global institutional perspective, could be seen as a creative anarchy of climate action.  Fragmentation in climate policy is not surprising in a world of multiple actors, many generating ‘policy’, and many more just acting.  What’s more, climate change has such diverse impacts and implications that fragmented responses are not only unsurprising, but likely.  Fragmentation presents itself as a problem from the point of view of coherent ‘joined-up’ government policy, or mechanisms for global governance, which may themselves raise concerns if this amounts to Wainwright and Mann’s (2012) ‘climate leviathan’.  However, fragmentation presents itself as an opportunity from the perspective of those who feel the need to act, with or without a coherent policy framework provided by governmental actors.  What is interesting and important about this development is that political anarchy of this sort may become the norm.  Climate policy anarchy presages wider developments in the form, mode and locale of political action (now demonstrated also, and differently, by the ‘Arab Spring’).  The corollaries of concerns expressed about climate change – if they are clearly expressed (Norgaard 2011) – which make climate change politically salient (beyond environmentalism, which was never a coherent monolithic ideology anyway), are normal bread-and-butter political issues of economic development of some sort, comprising production, distribution and consumption of land, food, water, energy and attendant livelihoods.  So the political ‘spill-over’ from climate anarchy should be both generally significant and not altogether surprising, and is fuelled by extreme weather events which are linked to climate change in popular consciousness and discourse.  
It should be clear that the anarchy addressed here is not that of interstate conflict or social breakdown, though this may play well in some of the discourse.  Indeed states and other significant actors must play a role; but if states must respond, they are not leading climate policy, and state-centric perspectives cannot account for this emerging international disorganization.  As Okereke et al note, “current approaches to the theorization of the governing of global environmental problems have reached a conceptual impasse” (Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009: 72).  In particular the analytical problems of environmental governance encompass traditional concerns of international thought such as political structure, agency, legitimacy, and distributional issues (Earth System Governance project 2010).  At the same time, substantive novel issues of environmental governance have had limited impact on conceptual development; the equivalent of business-as-usual in international practice.
Hence the argument here is that contrary to a constructivist orthodoxy about power politics, anarchy is not quite what states make of it (Wendt 1992), but rather anarchy still makes states – just not as they might wish, or in their own image.  If anarchy thus defines states, it no longer does so along state-centric lines, but instead through a less formal yet more substantial and generalized form of political anarchy – such as “climate anarchy”.  If the sovereign state is a default political form when empires reach “tipping point” (Reus-Smit 2011: 207) what happens when states in turn reach a similar point of incapability?  Although Spruyt (1994) suggested that states dominate the international order because of their ability to deliver effectively on issues of free-riding, transaction costs and citizen commitment, the climate change policy area seems to suggest the opposite.  Indeed, rather than resolving the attending problems of markets and hierarchies, states seem unable to cope with these challenges in the post-Westphalian context of global climate policy.  Where prior to the Copenhagen debacle of 2009 Deere-Birkbeck identified the priority of “swift coordination among international organizations and meaningful engagement of relevant stakeholders” (Deere-Birkbeck 2009: 1194), this relationship may now be inverted such that non-governmental stakeholders are acting in advance of coordinated global governance.  While constructivist points of reference in ideas and identities certainly apply, the actors and context of climate policy are more various.  This new kind of “anarchical society” guides or constrains a wide range of political agents, and modes of governance.  Seckinelgin points to the tension between political demands for ecological responsibility and those for responsibility to a bounded group defined by territorial jurisdiction; in effect, ecological problems are not accessible to traditional international politics, because of the tendency to foreclose opportunities for political contestation (Seckinelgin 2005).  However, there are any number of emerging, if initially weak, forms of agency in the climate context (Schroeder 2010; Benecke (​http:​/​​/​www.springerlink.com​/​content​/​?Author=Elisabeth+Benecke" \o "View content where Author is Elisabeth Benecke​) 2011).  Thus an “international society” (a society of states) construction of inter-state relations is too limited an account of an emerging global politics now more clearly revealed by the issue of climate change.  If political identities and interests are challenged and transformed by climate issues, this evokes a new sociology of world politics.
By revealing shifts in political agency, climate policy is perhaps a leitmotif of 21st century global politics.  This is because, or in spite of, apparent policy failures in the context of collapsing agreement on the Kyoto Protocol (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) emissions reductions targets - Canada simply withdrew from the agreement to avoid penalties for missed targets - and the absence of any replacement other than the promise of future agreement made at Durban in 2011 and Doha in 2012, and again in Warsaw in 2013 (with the need for agreement in Paris in 2015 looming large).  Climate issues suggest the need for a broader account of more anarchical socio-political structures, populated by a broader range of agents: for example, a “thick” description (Adger, Brown, Fairbrass, Jordan, Paavola, Rosendo, and Seyfang 2003) of a still somewhat “thin” democracy (Lappé 2007: 9).  Simply put, climate politics does not happen in one place, and yet there is no coherent theoretical account of this diversity in post-sovereign forms of governance.

An Emergent Anarchy
The substantive and generalized structural anarchy that demands our attention is thus evident, if not well accounted for – though there are possibilities in the somewhat amorphous global-local terms of “globalization” and resultant social multidimensionality (Holton 2011).  For example, if rapidly developing (and now dominant) state political-economies such as China, India and Brazil (let alone chronically underdeveloped countries) may view the currently proposed international distribution of climate burdens as unfair, that sense of unfairness has perhaps not extended to internal mal-distribution and elements of over-consuming affluence within those societies, and advanced political-economies such as the USA and Japan are evading commitments altogether.  The failure to reach agreement at Copenhagen in 2009 was widely viewed as a diplomatic train wreck, with expectations for rescuing the institutional position at Cancun in 2010 being “modest, with few anticipating a legally-binding outcome or agreement” and in the end “most participants acknowledged that it was a relatively small step in combating climate change” (Akanle, Appleton, Kulovesi, Recio, Schulz, Spence, and Sommerville 2010).  Subsequent progress at Durban at the end of 2011 was an equally limited agreement to agree, and while the idea of “loss and damage” for less developed countries was floated at Doha in 2012 (and revisited at Warsaw in 2013) the outcomes were weak and vague: compromise text to allow declaration of diplomatic success with commitments being postponed yet again.  At one point civil society delegates walked out of the Warsaw venue in protest at the lack of progress, and at a distracting coal industry event being held at the same time, while a Philippines representative’s hunger strike drew attention to loss of life and livelihood caused by one of the increasingly intense tropical storms.
As diverse elements of anarchy emerge around the world, and global governance functions increasingly devolve to a local or trans-local level, the response to climate change in particular may amount to a new paradigm (Linstroth and Bell 2007).  Mohamed Nasheed said, even while fending off dictatorship in the Maldives: "Well, I believe international decisions are made because of small decisions and if the small decisions are not made, we will never get international decisions. Small decisions – solar panels, wind farms, windmills – these will have an impact on decision-making.  So small decisions are necessary to build a bigger understanding and agreement" (Aitkenhead 2012).  If climate issues are not uniquely driving political change, they are clearly indicative of novel anarchic circumstances of global politics, and invite a novel account.  Concern with the fragmentation, deterritorialization, and hybridization of climate governance, is reflected in recent works by Biermann, et al (Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt and Zelli 2009; Biermann, Pattberg, and Zelli 2010).  Instead of responding to such concerns by attempting to restore international governance mechanisms it is perhaps better to grasp the political logic of climate change. Thus it is necessary to contemplate emerging forms of climate governmentalities in order to better understand climate governance “beyond the state” through different kinds of emerging institutionalized arenas, as “actors deliberately seek to address the problem of climate change outside of formal regulations or requirements of state agencies” (Earth System Governance project 2011; Pattberg and Stripple 2008: 374).  The undertaking involves, in part, interrogating the global climate polity that is constructed when climate goes “from being apolitical (just “the weather”, essentially) to being an object of deliberate governance – a “governance-object”, that is, something constructed as a real and distinct entity that is malleable and worth governing” (Corry 2012: 15).  The implication here is a shift in analysis from actors, institutions and governance towards the constitution and construction of ‘climate’ in various ways, including those that permit the indirect exercise of liberal power or “governmentality” and the depoliticization of climate issues (Methmann 2011). Keohane and Victor support a more nuanced view of diversity in “regime complexes”, within an institutional setting (Keohane and Victor 2011), and if perhaps too readily implying the necessity and possibility of an institutional “fix”, this clearly identifies the fragmentary nature of current global environmental governance.  It remains to determine the balance between state and society in the climate policy mix, or between political and social institutions as frameworks for policy.  Even Ruggie’s “global public domain” is not expected to replace states but rather set them in “global frameworks of social capacity and agency that did not previously exist” (Ruggie 2004: 519).  Hence the state-centric notion of anarchy is attenuated by the anarchy of social forces, which in turn have their own agency and capacity.  This allows for an analysis of “climate anarchy” that is not the negatively constructed anarchy of inter-state competition, but the positively constructed anarchy of social coordination.
In these circumstances of cognitive anxiety about the nature of the political order, it seems we need to find some new ideas, or perhaps as Haas says, to “mix and match” (Schouten 2008).  For Haas, the big challenge is globalization and its emerging “multiple actors, networks, complexity, uncertainty, and framing” which require a better understanding of “reflexive change, agency and multi-level dynamics” (Schouten 2008).  Certainly the institutions for governing globalization are lacking, and in particular the globalized consequences of climate change are throwing up substantial theoretical implications as well as practical challenges. 
 “There seems no doubt: the 21st century is set to be one where issues of climate, resources and energy are paramount”, say Szerszynski and Urry in their categorical description of the situation:  “the material world apparently does matter and can ‘bite back’ and the ‘economies and societies of whole continents may well have transformed conditions of life” (Szerszynski and Urry 2010: 1).  They mean “to strengthen the argument that climate change should be a, or even perhaps the, crucial topic and policy domain for social science” (Szerszynski and Urry 2010: 3).  Picking up this challenge, Shove says that “theoretical consideration of climate change revolves around a handful of slow-moving, essentially classic problems” (Shove 2010: 278) and deplores “the mutual isolation of social theory and climate change policy at exactly the moment when the social sciences (broadly defined) have most to offer” (Shove 2010: 285). Jasanoff further argues that “climate change produces discordances in established ways of understanding the human place in nature, and so offers unique challenges and opportunities for the interpretive [emphasis added] social sciences” (Jasanoff 2010: 233).  The issues that climate change confronts us with “have not passed through complex processes of social accreditation on a global scale”, so representations of climate issues are “decoupled from most modern systems of experience and understanding”, with “scalar dislocations” of our understandings of “community, polity, space and time”.  More positively, she notes that this provides us with “new conversational opportunities being actively pursued by an immense variety of actors, both local and translocal”.  Intellectually, these disruptive, turbulent and discordant circumstances open the way for interpretation (Jasanoff 2010: 249).  In respect of more familiar discontinuities, Parks and Roberts argue that “the lack of convergence on climate grew almost inevitably from our starkly unequal world, which has created and perpetuated highly divergent ways of thinking (worldviews and causal beliefs) and promoted particularistic notions of fairness (principled beliefs)” (Parks and Roberts 2010: 136).  Taken together, these views suggest a general and complex problem of talking at cross purposes about unfamiliar problems.

Climate Anarchy and Political Order
So if government per se is on the ropes in the struggle to address climate change, and global governance is likewise troubled, and for some troubling, what remains to be captured by the concept of “climate anarchy”?  The point here, and one which is widely acknowledged in practice if not well accounted for theoretically, is that global climate governance is not a singular locus of politics.  Hence it does not offer itself as an already coherent area of political engagement.  This perhaps explains why coherence seems to be imposed upon climate negotiations by effectively subsuming them within the familiar framework of a trade regime.  If there remains something perceptible called global governance in the climate change context, it must be understood to constitute – and be constituted by – political activity taking place “elsewhere” than globally.  Notions of multi-level governance or institutional framings, if not descriptively inappropriate, when applied analytically to the diverse sites of climate politics tend to solidify what is essentially fluid.  The idea of “climate anarchy” captures such diversity and fluidity without determining a fixed hierarchical politics, suggesting a different sociological character of political order. 
Whereas 19th Century realpolitik approaches to anarchy in the international system emphasize national survival and international system stability, climate anarchy emphasizes human survival and eco-system stability.  Sovereignty, even territoriality in a literal sense, will be difficult to maintain under conditions of climate change.  Efforts to address 21st Century transnational challenges of security, development and environment have been confounded by sovereignty, and so also have underlined the necessity of abandoning the residual myth of sovereignty in order to re-forge political association along different lines.  So if a classical concern with anarchy neglects interdependence (Milner 1991), climate anarchy embraces it as an assumption, and not just for nation-states.  If climate change has become a political issue on roughly the same timetable as globalization, they are not the same thing, and addressing the latter will not capture the political significance of the former.  In terms of anarchy as a problematic, mainstream debates have engaged various understandings of anarchy in the international system, though with ‘disagreement as to what this means and why it matters’ (Baldwin 1993: 4).  A concern with orderly decision-making seems to drive such debate, and while the implications are broad in scope and domain (not to say abstract) it remains a state-centric dialogue across a fairly narrow field of vision about what constitutes world politics –  of course we might instead think in terms of world sociology, with the meaning of the state being debated (Halliday 1987).  That is to say, a focus on anarchy as a structural feature of the states system overshadows a wider range of collaborative political dynamics which are less overtly structured but nevertheless orderly.  Thus Bull’s (1977) ‘anarchical society’ of states rests on the moral priority of a world society, which invokes considerations of justice (the political virtue) in support of any sustainable order (perhaps here we could think in terms of climate justice, with respect to distribution of climate burdens).  Naturally, a less formally structured kind of political order is harder to capture intellectually, but also difficult to capture in practice, with the significant advantage of leaving open the answer to that obvious question: ‘whose order?’  A likely, if tentative, answer to the question is that (in less structured circumstances) the political order ‘belongs’ to participants who constitute it through their practices.  Hence the order may change with participants and practices, rather than being constitutionally fixed over time and space, if nevertheless exposed to potential influences of hierarchies and external forces.  
Where Deudney’s (2006) cure for anarchy and hierarchy is a negative approach in the form of mutual restraint (negarchy), climate anarchy needs no such cure as it represents positive forms of association necessitated by a common threat of climate change. Rather than a threatening ‘other’ to be restrained, climate threats require self-restraint – though some mutuality is certainly in order.  Deudney rightly indicates the centrality of changing material circumstances – and climate must surely qualify – which open the way to new political forms, if not necessarily those of global governance.  Where Sassen (2006) indicates the denationalizing (rather than deterritorializing) of state practices under globalization, it is the deterritorializing logic of climate change that engenders climate anarchy – and she would recognize such emergent affiliations.  The point about climate impacts is that they don’t present themselves conveniently as an issue to an historically inherited political form, but rather as an issue around which novel political forms cohere as new parts of the whole.  
Climate anarchy thus both reflects and absorbs the political significance of complex socio-economic systems which are agency-based yet structured by climate change.  It is thus a positive and creative anarchy rather than the negative and defensive anarchy of inherited practices.  Long-standing debates about the demise of the nation-state and the relevance of ‘international relations’ are not the point of reference, since clearly features of both will survive in some recognisable reinvented form – the point is that a new climate anarchy is already emerging and exists in and around efforts to address the socio-political and economic consequences of climate change, and so represents a new political context regardless of how and whether inherited practices adjust to keep up. 
There are a number of possible illustrations of a changing order, and of disruptive tendencies in climate politics.  These include state-centric examples such as Papua New Guinea challenging US leadership at the Bali conference on climate change in December 2007.  There are also a wide range of challenges to public (including international) policy arising from enhanced citizen participation, as under the terms of the Aarhus convention, in places like Central Asia and Europe, and in different contexts elsewhere in places like Latin America.  Beyond the governmental framing of ‘policy’, local direct action and engagement practices enable communities to cope with the challenges of climate change without reference to governments at all.  Cases ranging from municipal climate initiatives (Barber 2013) around the world to the floundering diplomacy of post-Kyoto negotiations point to a wide range of novel political developments (Hoffmann 2011).  The challenge is to make some sense of what appears to be an unsettled arena of politics and political inquiry, following the “rise and fall of a global climate polity” (Corry 2013).  A brief consideration of three aspects of this challenge may help:  Firstly, the socio-political construction of climate issues; secondly, the prospects for, and prospective approaches to, governance of climate issues; thirdly, the anarchical characteristics that appear in this political domain.  

Climate Constructions
The tools and materials of climate construction are various, and include the whole range of human activities (which surely all bear on the facts of climate change) and their corollaries in scholarly disciplines: emotions, rationality and psychology; fairness, justice and the law; production, consumption and economics; kinship, identity groups and sociology; collective choice, participation, and politics.  Here there is space enough to pick apart but a few of these, in order to expose some aspects of the construction process which determines how and why climate issues are addressed in an increasingly anarchic fashion.

Climate & the Politics of Peril
As disasters and emergencies attract more attention, it is not surprising that for both authentic and instrumental reasons climate concern is often couched in terms of planetary peril.  In the most positive sense, this may be viewed as an emotional response – as indicated by the Climate Change Communication Advisory Group and other authors such as Moser (Climate Change Communication Advisory Group 2010; Moser 2007).  This demands that someone take responsibility, and action, to prevent disaster.  It appears that the response to this demand is taking an anarchical form.  According to Bulkeley and Moser the “empirical answer to the question of responsibility appears to be that a multi-scale, multi-actor vision of responsibility for climate protection is beginning to be realized” as a multiplicity of actors take matters in to their own hands, without waiting for states or inter-state agreement (Bulkeley and Moser (​http:​/​​/​muse.jhu.edu​/​journals​/​global_environmental_politics​/​v007​/​7.2bulkeley.html" \l "bio2​) 2007: 8).  The urgency that such analysis implies is itself part of the social construction of climate issues, and the same tone and statement of concern about both social and environmental disruption is found across a range of scholarship:  “The research community provides much information to support discussions on “dangerous climate change” (Richardson, et al 2009: 4). 
Amongst the characterizations of the climate issue, and its attendant complications in the social, economic and political realms, is an historical sensibility about the possibility for addressing the issue in timely fashion:  “The grave tragedy of our times is that the urgency to save lives conflicts with the slow pace of history and social change” (Dimitrov 2010: 819).  This absent sense of urgency is what disappoints civil society commentators about the 2012 “Doha Climate Gateway”, which saves the legal process but takes “no real action to combat climate change” (Akanle, Allen, Antonich, Appleton, Kosolapova, Kulovesi, Recio 2012). 

Climate and Social Change
This disjuncture between state and society perspectives invites an alternative “climate anarchy” account to enlighten the political implications of social change. Whether as structural change in terms of recasting distributions of wealth and poverty, or as changes in agent “identity” as Crompton and Kasser suggest in terms of cultural values, climate issues appear to be wedded to notions of society (Crompton and Kasser 2009).  At the same time, among the specifically political issues which underlie collective concern with climate change are the considerable variations in climate impact, and contributions to it, both current and historical.  The equity dimensions attract considerable attention, and rightly so.  “Climate change is having, and will have, strongly differential effects on people within and between countries and regions, on this generation and future generations, and on human societies and the natural world” (Richardson, et al 2009: 4).
Beyond climate impacts, and in terms of contributions to climate change through emissions, it is important to note that the same poverty which makes societies vulnerable also means that access to and use of resources is limited.  In particular, energy consumption and its corollary in carbon emissions is limited by poverty.  It is already well understood that the balance of overall consumption of resources per capita heavily favours the most developed fifth of the world’s population – wherever they may be in the “global north”.  It would hardly be surprising if climate aspects of global inequality did not weigh heavily in political deliberations, and cast a pall over institutional discussions between state elites.  Thus the question of representation arises in the context of constructing climate.


Sociology of Climate Politics
What then is the relationship of familiar institutionalized forms of democracy, for example, to participation in climate politics?  If Baettig and Bernauer  suggest the effects of democracy are generally positive (Baettig and Bernauer 2009), by contrast, Sprinz  suggests that “it is often doubted that democracies can pursue long-term policies due to the structured length of terms of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches”, and goes on to note that decentralization of authority “may pose additional challenges to governance” in the form of inconsistencies over time and space (Sprinz 2009).  Indeed it may; the issue is whether challenging governance is a good thing.  Later in the same journal issue, international anarchy is specifically indicated as a problem for climate policy implementation (Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal 2009).  The implication is a need for institutional solutions to the problem.  However, the counter point is that a wider anarchy could be embraced as an alternative mode of “governance” to guide states as well as other actors.  Litfin points to issues of authority and legitimacy under the political conditions of climate change, and consequent emerging post-national forms of political identity (Litfin 2000).  A report for a group of climate-relevant NGOs identifies a pattern of opportunities in different perspectives, such as: “the self-interest versus common interest frames; the strict father versus nurturant parent frames; and the elite governance versus participative democracy frames” (Crompton 2010: 58).  
With shifts of power in the context of inter-state climate negotiations from the historical polluters of the old industrial states to the most significant carbon emitters among the newly industrialized and rapidly “developing” states, even “developing countries acknowledged that the culprits were in the developing world” (Dimitrov 2010: 817).  The constructed world of great and small “powers” seems rather different in the refracted light of climate issues, and it must be expected that governing in this context is novel.
So both the players and the game have shifted with the emergence of climate politics in a global society.  For governments, the demand for and supply of their controlling authority shifts with the presence or absence of enabling forms of legitimacy.  For non-governmental actors, the inclination and ability to provide such legitimacy varies with the form of engagement in climate governance and their socialization as witnesses, architects or detractors (Burgiel and Wood 2012).

Climate Governances
Governance is plainly a tempting category of analysis, which allows evasion of the more pernicious aspects of government per se.  It also has the merit of acknowledging the rather limited capacity of state governmental authority to actually address climate change, even through coordinated cooperative policy, let alone by unilateral state action.  Governance may remain the least worst way to approach climate problems, though in order to be at all effective it would also have to shed the last vestiges of the control imperative that governing typically implies.  Governance could invoke instead some modern version of classical notions of self-government in the minimal sense of cooperative co-existence – which, contrary to agonistic accounts, can be viewed as the essence of politics.

Politics of Cooperation
Does political cooperation demand formal, or even informal, political institutions or simply the existing social institutions of discursive practice?  The terms of the joint research programme of the “Global Governance Project” (http://www.glogov.org/ (​http:​/​​/​www.glogov.org​/​​)) address three characteristics: the increasing participation of actors other than states (“multi-actor governance”); new mechanisms of organization such as public-private and private-private partnerships; different layers and clusters of rule-making and rule-implementation, both vertically between supranational, international, national and sub-national layers of authority (“multilevel governance”) and horizontally between different parallel rule-making systems.  In a programme working paper, Vijge is concerned to account for proposals to “improve” fragmented international environmental governance and calls to establish an international environment organization.  He indicates obstacles to reform arising from “three strands of institutional theories: historical institutionalism, discursive institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism” (Vijge 2010: ii).  Whether or not these are obstacles to every political path, they illustrate the political challenges of climate anarchy.  In particular, here, discursive institutionalism employs a cultural approach, which shows differences between countries “concern very basic differences in views on how best to approach environmental issues” (Vijge 2010: 15).  In spite of this nuanced unpacking of institutionalist perspectives, it may be that it is less a matter of institutional improvement and more a matter of improving the quality of dialogue to underwrite trust and cooperation.  
With attention shifting from hard to soft power, we do well to acknowledge that “the bulk of international politics is non-coercive and even non-conflictuous” (van Ham 2010: 45).  The cooperative aspects of politics may thus dominate the scene (even if they attract less attention), but it remains that institutional approaches seeking to build and cement such cooperation tend also to seek the fixed relations of bureaucratic process.  If there is plenty of room for cooperation under anarchy, it is less susceptible to formal institutionalization.  The institutional dimensions may have to remain at the level of social grammar. For van Ham, the “power of practice is the power to produce intersubjective meaning within social structures” (van Ham 2010: 45).  This makes social power complex and ambiguous; which isn’t so much a challenge to resolve the complexity and ambiguity, as to embrace and understand it.  
Ockwell et al “believe there is potential for politically and psychologically smart communication approaches that stimulate demand for climate regulation by building on grassroots engagement and accompanying it with strong legislation to effect rapid low carbon behavior change” (Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2009: 323).  However, while as a political strategy this may have merit, it also smacks of a confidence trick, or “spin”, to dupe citizens into acquiescence.  It assumes, or requires, a settled view of necessary climate action and a locus of decision-making for that purpose in order to deliver the promise that “strong top-down government leadership, together with bottom-up facilitation of public acceptance to regulation, would address many of the barriers to action” (Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2009: 323).  This seems rather too sanguine about the capacity for effective governance, not just from the top-down, but also by the back-door means of prompting bottom-up acceptance of a top-down agenda.  If, however, the agenda were genuinely shared, and governance seemed to operate in the service of society in this sense, then it might yet deliver the desired climate outcomes – but the caveat is a significant one, since a shared agenda is not yet apparent.
Dimitrov underscores the “bleak prospects of the consensus-based UN process for responding to climate change”, the “limits of UN universal multilateralism” and raises “questions concerning the adequacy of global institutions” (Dimitrov 2010: 817).  Again, if it is multilateral inter-state processes that are lacking, there are other avenues to consensus, and other (non-state) political spaces for it – including politically significant uses of new social media.

Politics of Sustainability
If states have failed to fully capture the sustainability agenda in respect of climate, civil society has not, though the issue of individual or collective agency remains. Does the politics of climate change simply equate to individual behaviour and sustainable practices, and hence rely on the adoption of appropriate values?  The assumption that “framing” matters is what underlies the concerns addressed above about the role of values in constructions of the climate issue (Lakoff 2009).  For example, studies indicate that guilt and anxiety operate somewhat differently, as strategies for encouraging “green” behaviour.  In particular collective guilt pertains when people think “their group is responsible for harm done, as well as see it as feasible to repair the harm done”, and that people perceive “harm from global warming as greater when it was caused by humans” (Ferguson and Branscombe 2010: 137).  Anxiety, or appeal to fear about harm to future generations, for example, seems to be a less compelling factor.  
Either way, attitudes seem to hinge on the ability to do something about a sustainable future, collectively, and of course at individual level this ability is apparently much reduced.  Ockwell et al advocate two distinct approaches to engaging the general public; facilitating public acceptance of regulation, and stimulating grass-roots action by “affective and rational engagement with climate change” (Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2009: 305).  Benecke, examining attributes and capabilities of the different actors in a climate context, and applying a stakeholder network analysis, identifies different characteristics that may support or hinder practical responses to climate change – such as, in this example, the development of wind power in India (Benecke (​http:​/​​/​www.springerlink.com​/​content​/​?Author=Elisabeth+Benecke" \o "View content where Author is Elisabeth Benecke​) 2011). 
A disruptive element is conceptual uncertainty about sustainability.  It may mean everything and nothing.  However, the core issue is inescapable: can a practice be sustained indefinitely?  Few practices would meet that standard, and adding particular conditions like “ecological” and “economical” simply raises the threshold – or widens the debate among political actors at different levels.  Clearly the role of engaged individuals at the grass roots is essential, wherever policy is “made”, but the question of the merits of institutionally structured politics is not yet answered.  If individual commitments and actions are fundamentally important, as they must be in an anarchistic perspective, it follows that effective collective action on climate change demands some added-value from the collective process – and this may indeed be understood as economic sustainability.

Political-Economy of Climate
With the Rio+20 agenda pursuing a “green economy”, even relatively uncontroversial assumptions about how the relative merits of states and markets are to be tested or operationalized are disrupted by climate issues (in terms of a “low-carbon economy”).  Trade-offs around benefits and burdens are not likely to deliver anything appropriate to addressing climate change on a relevant timescale.
Perhaps it is conventional characteristics of analysis that need to be challenged:  “Cost-benefit analysis is just the wrong paradigm for thinking about global warming” (Lakoff 2009).  If the standard approach to international economic governance of trade and finance is not appropriate to climate issues, the efforts to bridge the perceived gap prompt Dimitrov to suggest that international climate change negotiations “entail a fundamental transformation of the global economy and constitute the single most important process in world politics”.  If it is an unsuccessful process in inter-governmental terms, given the “political failure of the international community to create a global climate treaty”, climate policy is nevertheless making considerable progress world-wide: “While the UN negotiations process is deadlocked, multilevel climate governance is thriving” (Dimitrov 2010: 795).
Newell and Paterson consider the prospects and problems of such economic change.  If a global economic transformation is underway, and market forces might yet turn a capitalist global economy away from climate risks,  collective political solutions must confront the challenges of global justice, corporate power, and capitalist market dominance to potential climate solutions (Newell and Paterson 2010).
Without denying the significance of states and markets in influencing the global political economy, such an elite-oriented top-down perspective on power relations in the political economy of climate change does not capture the range of other forces and actors at work.  Major “players” in the markets seem to have a determining influence, but on the other hand “popular culture and consumer habits have become major conduits of social power in international politics”, constituting “the biopolitical backdrop against which (international) politics takes place” (van Ham 2010: 50).  It is not surprising that international climate agreements appear to emulate trade agreements, as states play for advantage or at least some economic protection in their mutual dealings.  Perhaps it is also not surprising that other actors are less than impressed with the effectiveness of such agreements.
Dimitrov suggests an appropriate historical perspective may help, since we are “embarking on a global transition to a new economy that constitutes a veritable revolution, the Energy Revolution”, which is of a magnitude to warrant comparison with the Industrial Revolution (Dimitrov 2010: 819).  What’s more, the climate justice movement shares with the wider global justice movement a concern with inequalities.  In the climate case inequalities arise from the variation in impacts and threats to existence presented by climate change (Guerrero 2011), which is also of a magnitude to warrant comparison with historical transformations in the international order.  Indeed there is some foundation to the idea of “natural justice” of which our shared environment, and climate, is an integral part (Belsey 1994: 60) – concern with maintaining a balance is something power politics and the conservation of nature have in common.

Climate Anarchies
So it seems there are a number of anarchies at play in the climate context.  International (structural) political anarchy is but one of these.  Even within such anarchy there reside the political anarchies of each of the several multiple levels of political interaction, and the various framings of the political relations that climate issues give rise to.  On top of this is an element of intellectual anarchy in our efforts to grasp the issues.

Anti-governance?
Thus the relationship between climate anarchy and climate governance remains undetermined.  The notion of international anarchy is wedded to the sovereign state (Schmidt 1998), while climate anarchy is not.  So is climate anarchy a “pure” form of individualist anarchy, or merely another structural anarchy of the “international” sort?  This is a difficult issue to resolve under circumstances of multiple and shifting forms of post-sovereign government and governmentality.
Okereke et al note the “explosion of parallel initiatives” by non-state actors which are “broadening climate governance ‘beyond’ the realms of the international climate regime”.  As they are independent of the climate regime, “such initiatives and practices significantly affect how we conceptualize and understand the nature of global climate governance” (Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009: 72).
Matthew considers a recent review of U.S. diplomatic strategy in which leadership, it is thought, “depends in significant measure on our capacity to generate, focus, and exercise ‘civilian power’”, apparently because “some non-state actors have become incredibly powerful in the global arena, while some states remain very fragile, and we need to work with both”.  Matthew notes the casual references to uncertainty and complexity in this version of the global political environment, and says this “rationale for civilian power and institutional reform, adopts the analytical and normative vocabularies of the post-Cold War world but skirts the tough issues such language raises” (Matthew 2011). 
This suggests that state power is learning new ways to capture non-state power, though in the end this may prove self-defeating – at least from a state-centric perspective.  Alternatively, new modes of agency and the stakeholder networks to support them at different levels in different contexts are emerging everywhere (Schroeder 2010; Benecke (​http:​/​​/​www.springerlink.com​/​content​/​?Author=Elisabeth+Benecke" \o "View content where Author is Elisabeth Benecke​) 2011).  States’ pursuit of “soft power” may thus inadvertently support climate anarchy.
More fundamentally, the conceptual framework of sovereign statehood is challenged by alternative political practices that inevitably translate into conceptual and theoretical frameworks.  Such a challenge is engaged by Goodhart and Tanichev in exploring the democratic possibilities of global governance in the absence of popular sovereignty – “sovereignty is necessarily a conditional good, one valued because it enables constitutional democratic government”, and so “if sovereignty no longer enables democracy or represents an obstacle to the realization of freedom and equality, its normative justification collapses” (Goodhart and Tanichev 2011: 1065).  The challenge for global climate governance follows the same logic, not just because issues of democracy and equality resonate there, but because the conditional good of climate governance is tested by its non-sovereign constituent actors.

New Political Spaces
In this clouded vision of the political map, with divergent and convergent tendencies simultaneously at work, what kinds of spaces are available for political engagement, and what kinds of links are there between people within and between these spaces?  The link between political community and policy may be traditionally viewed through the lense of representative politics and international public diplomacy.  In this context “the effect of democracy on levels of political commitment to climate change mitigation (policy output) is positive. In contrast, the effect on policy outcomes, measured in terms of emission levels and trends, is ambiguous” (Baettig and Bernauer 2009: 281).  Yet this may reveal something about where climate politics “happens” and how, rather than simply providing an indicator of institutional effectiveness.
The increasing significance of non-state (non-institutionalized) actors, and recognition of that significance, may point towards “alternative ‘mentalities’ of rule, and render the issue of climate change ‘practical’” (Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009: 73).  Even within an institutional context there is more efficacy in “bottom-up” than in “top-down”.  Schreurs emphasizes sub-state actors, which must ultimately implement climate policy (Schreurs 2008).  Elsewhere she notes the requirement for integrated action at multiple “levels” and in multiple spheres (Schreurs 2010).
A pertinent example is The International Council for Local Government Initiatives – Local Governments for Sustainability, which since 1990 has pursued a mandate to address sustainability issues, with over 1220 local government members representing more than half a billion people.  Most recently it has been behind the Global Covenant of Mayors on Climate – the Mexico City Pact, which reflects commitment to local climate action, and provides enhanced political status as “stakeholders”.

New Ways of Politics
If climate issues are viewed pragmatically, this suggests that new ways to do climate politics are as important as places to do it.  These new ways of political engagement amount to a renegotiation of the terms, and the terminology, of climate politics. Dialogue, communication and cooperation around climate issues must rest on engagement at the grass roots level, whatever the aspirations for wider coordination.  This is an essentially anarchical politics, and should be analysed as such, even if there is ample opportunity for collective action.  Finding the most effective political and ecological balance remains a challenge for the modes of communication (Ockwell, Whitmarsh and O’Neill 2009), and furthermore “there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues” (Climate Change Communication Advisory Group 2010).  This seems an honest way of doing politics under circumstances where “we see today not only civic dislocation but new conversational opportunities being actively pursued by an immense variety of actors, both local and translocal” (Jasanoff 2010: 249).

Conclusion - Climate Reconstructions
What then can be said of this increasing disorganization of world politics?  Among the most promising resolutions of the challenge is no resolution at all, since affirmation of a “correct” approach to climate issues simply begs the question of how and why it should be resolved.  Nevertheless, the most promising avenue to a more settled landscape of climate policy analysis may be that of communication.  Political engagement around the meaning and significance of climate issues is a necessary foundation for more pragmatic strategies for dealing with climate change,  making it necessary to “ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms)” (Climate Change Communication Advisory Group 2010).  
So if it can be said that there exists already a global institutionalism of rule-governed political behaviour, which is increasingly dysfunctional, there also exists sufficient societal understanding of climate issues to support an authentic common goal, and a healthily anarchic process of deliberation about climate change.  The challenge of coordinated collective action remains simply because “the global economy and ecology are both systems” (Lakoff 2009).  It is also why caution about an institutional fix must remain a permanent feature of climate politics, simply because the terms of climate anarchy point to local responses in a global context.
So if not by multilateral agreement per se, it nevertheless seems that moves at national and local levels towards a greener economy are already inevitable (Dimitrov 2010: 819).  This indicates a kind of coordinated anarchical politics, if not cooperative institutional politics.  Bulkeley and Moser (​http:​/​​/​muse.jhu.edu​/​journals​/​global_environmental_politics​/​v007​/​7.2bulkeley.html" \l "bio2​) make an empirical observation that “climate governance has effectively been taken out of (or at least beyond) the hands of international negotiators” (Bulkeley and Moser 2007: 7).  They go on to argue that the “multiplication and diversification of actors and sites of action” is “not only appropriate but necessary to manage this global, multi-faceted problem”, and requires common languages to resolve through “the emergence of many parallel discourses”, as “governance and social action for climate protection is taking place beyond” international institutional frameworks (Bulkeley and Moser 2007: 8-9).  
Interestingly, this implied diversity of political cultures underwrites the merit of accepting some ambiguity and flexibility (if not outright anarchy) in political structures.  For example, Keohane and Victor predict a continuing institutional dimension to climate change policy, though with decentralized narrowing of institutions around particular aspects, and so argue for a “regime complex” perspective for climate change as opposed to a comprehensive formal regime (Keohane and Victor 2011).  While speculating (in the face of apparent political difficulty, and practical challenges) that a deeper integrated regime might yet emerge, they conclude that the institutional framework of the UNFCCC could still constitute a negotiating forum, but that the need for flexibility and diversity point to a looser complex of specific regimes.  This perhaps simply reflects an abiding aspiration for global policy coherence despite an emergent climate anarchy.  As things stand in international climate negotiations, the only achievement of the Doha summit in 2012 was to preserve a legal framework, and of the Warsaw summit in 2013 to suggest a vague timetable for commitment, in the hope of  reaching a post-Kyoto agreement by 2015 for implementation from 2020, which now seems wishful thinking given the ‘glacial rate of negotiations’ and minimal political will to face up to maximal carbon emissions (Boyle 2012).
The argument for a “climate anarchy” perspective is that it better captures the tensions and dynamics of global politics surrounding climate change, compared to traditional international anarchical or institutional perspectives.  This is a constructive anarchy which allows for social engagement, rather than the negative anarchy of international relations which merely defends state sovereignty.  While a looser institutional complex is not an unreasonable assessment of political possibilities, this institutional approach seems unable to provide a satisfactory account of climate politics.  At the same time, the acknowledged need for flexibility and diversity points rather more to the “climate anarchy” perspective on seemingly chaotic climate politics, seen as a healthy anarchy which is accessible to a coherent account.  
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